ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND REVOLUTIONS

In times of confusion, it is always sane to return to fundamental principles. France – as everyone knows – is the sad scene of protests, police violence, looting and questionable political decisions.

Here, secondary school pupils are demanding more teachers, cover for absent staff and smaller classes. They denounce crumbling buildings, and excessively long school days. Alongside these material difficulties come the pressure of continuous assessment and anxieties surrounding Parcoursup, an anxiety-inducing and unequal website deciding on the future university of the pupils (let’s admit that Parcoursup is an instrument of the devil – no parent who has been through it will disagree with me).

There, university students are demanding additional funding for universities, more places in higher education and an end to selection through Parcoursup and MonMaster. Their demands also concern financial insecurity, with calls for increased student grants, effective access to one-euro meals for all, more student accommodation and a reduction in the cost of studying.

Here, teachers, education staff and parents are joining these protests. They are demanding the staffing and material resources needed to deliver lessons and improve conditions for studying and working.

There, some Yellow Vests are protesting against the high cost of living, particularly fuel prices. They demand the ability to live with dignity on their incomes.

Here, employees and pensioners are demanding higher wages and pensions, lower prices and public services worthy of the name. The CGT trade union also challenges the government’s budgetary priorities and calls for higher taxation of large fortunes and major corporations.

There, farmers have been called upon to join the protests by the Confédération paysanne. The union advocates a decent income for producers, quality food accessible to all, the preservation of public services in rural areas and policies that address climate change. It also highlights the difficulties caused by last summer’s heatwaves and rising diesel prices.

Here, some transport unions have announced strike notices and action to demand pay rises and greater recognition of their work.

There, finally, discontent also reaches some of those responsible for protection and emergency response: firefighters have been mobilising since last September, demanding more staff and equipment, sustainable funding for fire and rescue services, better protection of their health and recognition of the physical and psychological toll of their profession. Their demands also concern pay, careers and pensions. Police officers themselves, through the Alliance union, denounce the exhaustion of their ranks, their exposure to violence and instructions they consider contradictory.

The grievances of these two groups admittedly differ from those of secondary school pupils, teachers, employees, pensioners, farmers or lorry drivers, but ultimately they all raise the same question about the resources the State makes available to public services so that they can fulfil their duties.

All these groups question, in different ways, what institutions bring to their lives, whether in terms of respect for democracy, the quality of public services, civil protection, equal opportunities — and, more generally, their quality of life.

Ultimately, all these groups question the validity, relevance and strength of the bond linking them to those who govern them: the social contract.

I. The social contract

In political philosophy, the social contract establishes the legitimacy of power and the conditions under which we associate to form a society. The social contract illustrates the idea that State authority is legitimate because individuals agree to live according to shared rules that allow them to safeguard their rights.

The notion of the social contract is — in France, at least — closely associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who publishes The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right in 1762.

Through the social contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposes to reform the society in which he lives: that of the Ancien Régime, which allows neither the free expression of the general will nor that of the individual will.

The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right describes, in the form of a essay on political philosophy, how human beings, moving from the state of nature to a state of society, can establish a social order that serves the common interest. In the social pact Rousseau proposes, everyone must relinquish their particular rights and the law of the strongest to achieve the equality of rights that comes with forming a society.

Legitimate authority then rests on popular sovereignty and a general will directed towards the common good, far removed from obedience born of mere submission to force. The social contract thus rests on three ideas: sovereignty belongs to the people (government performs a function entrusted to it; it does not own power), the law expresses the general will, and citizens all submit to the same rules as equals.

The social contract answers two fundamental questions: why must we obey those in power, and what makes that power legitimate.

Today, the term social contract is used in a broader sense: citizens agree to obey the law and pay taxes in exchange for protection, public services and fair prospects. This is, of course, a modern interpretation, enriched through the prism of the French welfare State.

Speaking today of a breakdown of the social contract often means saying that those in power no longer fulfil the conditions that justify their authority: they demand obedience, but no longer sufficiently guarantee protection, equality or popular participation in political life.

There are two main forms of popular participation in political life: voting and demonstrating. Not to mention paying taxes, which seals the French social contract between a people and its government. Let’s see how these different dimensions of the French social contract operate in France today.

Voting

As a reminder, Emmanuel Macron is elected President of the Republic for the first time on 7 May 2017, in the second round against Marine Le Pen — and is re-elected on 24 April 2022 in the second round, once again against Marine Le Pen.

These nine years in office are punctuated by discrepancies between government decisions and the expression of voters’ and citizens’ wishes. I stress the two terms “voters and citizens” because they refer to two different situations: decisions that contradict the vote and popular protest, which overlap at different moments.

Decisions that contradict the vote. If we turn to situations in which the vote is contradicted, there are, it seems to me, two: Notre-Dame-des-Landes and the 2024 parliamentary elections.

In the case of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, voters in Loire-Atlantique express their support in a local consultation in 2016 for moving Nantes-Atlantique airport to Notre-Dame-des-Landes. Yet Édouard Philippe’s government announces in January 2018 that the relocation project is being abandoned. The consultation, as its name indicates, is merely consultative and therefore has no legally binding force — nevertheless, the government’s decision contradicts the result of the vote.

As for the parliamentary elections of 30 June and 7 July 2024, the New Popular Front comes first with 182 seats, ahead of Ensemble, which wins 168. Emmanuel Macron nevertheless chooses Michel Barnier, from Les Républicains, as Prime Minister on 5 September 2024 (after the post has been vacant for two months). No bloc has an absolute majority, and the Constitution in no way requires the New Popular Front to be placed at the head of the government, but the discrepancy between the popular vote and the choice of Prime Minister is glaring.

Popular protest. With the pension reform, the government maintains the increase in the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64, despite numerous demonstrations and majority opposition in opinion polls. On 16 March 2023, Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne forces the issue and invokes Article 49.3 to have the legislation adopted without a final vote in the National Assembly, which is entirely lawful from a legal standpoint — even if its adoption does not align with the popular will and circumvents any vote of approval or rejection by the people’s representatives.

The Duplomb law is another example. A petition against the Duplomb law is submitted on the National Assembly’s website in July 2025, gathers more than two million signatures and leads to a parliamentary debate in February 2026. Although this does not result in the law’s repeal, the petition does receive an institutional response through the parliamentary debate, which is not legally binding.

Finally, how could we fail to mention the Yellow Vests? The Yellow Vest crisis begins with a first national day of protest on 17 November 2018. Initially focused on fuel prices and fuel taxation, the protest broadens to purchasing power and questions of democratic representation.

In response to the Yellow Vest crisis, grievance books are opened in many town halls from late 2018, then incorporated into the Great National Debate launched in January 2019.

The Great National Debate provides some favourable responses to the Yellow Vests’ demands (in addition to the cancellation of the fuel tax increase, the increase in the in-work benefit, the tax exemption for overtime and the reduction in the CSG social levy for some pensioners: income tax cuts mainly benefiting the middle classes, the restoration of inflation-linked increases for smaller pensions, the Citizens’ Convention on Climate whose results will prove underwhelming, the abolition of ENA, replaced by ENA-but-with-another-name), but the desired institutional changes (making the shared-initiative referendum easier to trigger, introducing an element of proportional representation into parliamentary elections, reducing the number of parliamentarians) have not materialised.

As we can see, the problem lies less in the absence of a government response than in the growing dissonance between the popular will expressed in the streets, in petitions, in grievance books turned into Great National Debates — and government decisions.

This dissonance also occurs against a deteriorating economic and social backdrop that increasingly erodes the average French person’s purchasing power. Socio-economic disparities are becoming ever more glaring — the poor grow poorer and the rich grow richer, while the middle classes seem destined to disappear. The governing class, meanwhile, enjoys staggering benefits that are difficult to justify, whether in the form of remuneration, parliamentary expenses (and the lack of transparency surrounding how they are spent), institutional lifestyles in general (whether transport or accommodation), benefits after leaving government or the presidency, revolving-door moves into private companies (and the underlying cronyism between those in power and big business leaders) or, finally, civil servants’ pension arrangements.

What the fuck is going on with our taxes. Returning to this last point, on 12 October 2026, the Finance Bill for 2027 sets out, for the very first time in the entire history of finance bills, the cost of civil servants’ pensions for each ministry. The findings are revealing: 32% of the Ministry of Education’s budget (28.5 billion euros) and 30% of that of the Ministry of the Interior (10.4 billion euros) go towards funding pensions rather than public services — and so it goes for every ministry.

Meanwhile, the burden of taxes and social security contributions has risen over fifty years from 35–36% to nearly 44% of annual national wealth. Some want higher taxation of the ultra-rich, citing glaring inequity in taxation. This inequity is confirmed by a study published by the Institute for Public Policy in 2023 using 2016 data, which estimates that the effective tax rate reaches around 46% for the wealthiest 0.1%, but falls to 26% for the ultra-rich 0.0002% (75 French tax households in 2016). The study includes the undistributed profits of companies they own (which some dispute, regarding dividends not received as income yet to be realised) and already takes corporation tax into account (so this is not simply a comparison between their personal tax returns and those of ordinary employees).

To summarise, in 2026 the average French person works for longer and longer, pays more and more tax for increasingly deteriorated public services, within a framework of opaque budgetary policy and inequitable tax policy.

It would be wrong to say that Macron’s government does not uphold the rule of law when it comes to popular expression. It simply deploys every mechanism at its disposal to make its decisions (Article 49.3, the non-binding nature of consultations and petitions, etc.) — and God knows it has plenty at its disposal and uses them to the point of distorting their purpose.

Nevertheless, it would also be wrong to say that Macron’s government provides substantive and relevant responses to the French people, who are clearly waiting for profound institutional changes.

And it is precisely in this dissonance between popular demands and government responses that the weakness of the current French social contract lies.

Let’s turn to the right to demonstrate, the second dimension of popular expression.

The right to demonstrate

The right to demonstrate is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789. It has constitutional status, as confirmed by Constitutional Council Decisions No. 94-352 of 18 January 1995 and No. 2019-780 of 4 April 2019.

The ability to exercise it without fear illustrates — or fails to illustrate — the health of our rule of law, since it is a corollary of democracy: it is one of the most powerful means of expressing a collective conviction outside the voting booth.

The mere thought of going to a demonstration with a knot in one’s stomach is already, in itself, an initial infringement of the right to demonstrate. Thinking that one needs an impact-resistant helmet, rubber-sealed goggles, a lawyer’s name and a relative’s telephone number written on one’s arm deters more than a few people and already speaks volumes — far too much.

The second form of violence is, quite simply, physical violence. It is all the less tolerable because law enforcement officers hold the monopoly on public force and must be exemplary, since they represent the State every time they act.

The arsenal of protective equipment and weapons available to law enforcement would make anyone shudder, particularly when compared with demonstrators’ lack of body protection. Batons, sting-ball grenades (which must be thrown towards the ground and release rubber projectiles) and defensive projectile launchers (LBDs, intended to incapacitate violent individuals) are used arbitrarily, disproportionately and indiscriminately, and therefore cause serious injuries, mutilations and the loss of eyes.

Kettling, which has been prohibited since Council of State Decision No. 444849 of 10 June 2021, flourishes everywhere, placing demonstrators in great danger.

Concealing the “RIO” (the individual identification number every law enforcement officer must wear) is common practice and affords complete impunity.

The entire scenario of 2023 repeats itself in 2026, only worse. And that says a great deal about the state of our democracy, particularly when, in 2026, the protests involve secondary school pupils.

Following the debacle of the demonstrations on 17 October 2026, the French government decides over the following days to impose curfews from 11 pm to 6 am (through orders issued daily at around 8 pm, conveniently leaving no time for their legality to be challenged in court), to restrict demonstrations to legitimate organisations alone, to ban the wearing of protective equipment at demonstrations within a thousand metres of a secondary school or university in Paris and its inner suburbs, and to deploy 500 soldiers serving in Operation Sentinelle against its own population. Where the authorities should be defusing tensions, the State’s increasingly heavy-handed security response fuels the escalation of violence, using weapons legally classified under French law as military equipment (40 mm LBD projectile launchers).

Here, a teenager suffers a double jaw fracture and dental injuries after being hit by tear-gas projectiles on 28 September (the police officer has been placed under formal investigation). He is 14.

There, a teenager loses the sight in one eye during a blockade of his school on 30 September (a police officer suspected of firing the LBD shot is placed under formal investigation for aggravated violence on 13 October). He is 16.

Here, a teenager loses his hand following the explosion of a police grenade on 5 October (the circumstances are disputed: the public prosecutor’s office states that he allegedly picked up the grenade after it landed on the ground; his lawyer categorically denies this, but whatever the circumstances, how does a child end up facing a police grenade?). He is 15.

There, a teenager files a complaint for sexual assault on 8 October following a filmed baton strike between his buttocks (the IGPN, the police inspectorate, has opened an investigation into aggravated violence). He is 19.

Here, a 25-year-old photographer is seriously injured in the thigh on 17 October, with damage to his femoral artery requiring emergency surgery. According to his complaint, the injury was allegedly caused by a fragment of a police grenade.

Here, a volunteer street medic is also injured on 17 October during a filmed arrest near Place de la République — the violence of the arrest has triggered an IGPN investigation.

There, law enforcement officers inspect what is written on demonstrators’ placards. Here, the saline solution that soothes eyes amid the tear gas is confiscated.

Whether the two French public institutions, the Defender of Rights (which opposes the use of LBDs during demonstrations — without success) and the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, or Amnesty International and the Human Rights League, all call for a de-escalation of police and judicial violence that deepens distrust of institutions, better protection of peaceful protest and heightened vigilance towards minors.

Finally, what to think about the Minister of Justice — a member of the executive — who repeatedly intervenes in public to demand an exceptionally harsh criminal justice response, thereby putting pressure on the judiciary power (which is independent)?

What to think about the wave of arrests and fast-track trials? What to think about the risk of Justice being rushed through under political pressure, at the expense of an individual assessment of the facts and the rights of the defence?

As regards arrests, the Syndicat de la Magistrature, a French judges’ and prosecutors’ union, condemns the brutal arrests of secondary school pupils in its statement of 2 October 2026. It also criticises the use of certain criminal charges, notably “participation in a group formed with a view to preparing acts of violence or criminal damage”, which it considers excessively vague. The concern is that arrests may be based on collective suspicion rather than sufficiently individualised evidence.

As regards police custody and the subsequent presentation of suspects before prosecutors, critics denounce a system of mass processing that undermines the rights of the defence. Some lawyers describe overcrowded police stations, exhausted defendants and skeletal case files. Others highlight the utterly appalling conditions in which teenagers presumed innocent are detained while awaiting an appearance before a juvenile judge.

As regards fast-track trials, the main criticism concerns the limited time available to examine evidence, locate witnesses or gather information about the defendant’s personal circumstances. Some lawyers also denounce excessively harsh sentences and a failure to tailor them adequately to each individual case.

Finally, on 23 October, the Syndicat de la Magistrature condemns the Minister of Justice’s interventions in ongoing proceedings and stresses that he cannot dictate prosecutors’ submissions to the court. It announces that it will bring an urgent application before the Council of State on this issue.

How have we come to kettle, gas and brutalise our young people? I do not know.

What future is there for young people who are kettled, gassed and brutalised? I do not know.

The response of law enforcement to blockades and demonstrations is disproportionate, and all the harder to understand given that the police violence against demonstrators on 17 October was inversely proportional to the absence of law enforcement during the looting that took place that same evening.

II. On revolutions

To discredit the legitimacy of the social demands of the various groups currently demonstrating, some focus on the damage and looting that sadly marked the evening and night of 17 October, and maintain that the rights we enjoy today were won without violence.

Of course. Women voted to obtain the right to vote, and abortion rights were granted thanks to intensive lobbying aimed at stifling the knitting-needle trade.

Let’s be serious: our social gains owe a great deal to movements that caused disruption, interrupted the ordinary functioning of the economy or defied the law. The truth is that these social gains are the result of struggles over power, sometimes accompanied by clashes or violent repression.

While some social advances have been secured without physical violence through strikes, mobilisation or civil disobedience (paid leave, women’s suffrage, abortion rights, the right to strike), others have been accompanied by physical violence on the part of demonstrators (and law enforcement). The Paris Commune and the events of May 1968 are among them.

The Paris Commune. Let’s return to 1870. Following the defeat at Sedan by the Prussian armies and their German allies, the Second Empire collapses and the Republic is proclaimed on 4 September. Paris is soon besieged, and its inhabitants endure a Winter of deprivation. The armistice of 28 January 1871 is experienced as a capitulation by some Parisians, whose anger mounts. On 18 March, Adolphe Thiers’s government lights the fuse by attempting to seize the National Guard’s cannons, stored notably in Montmartre. The operation fails and triggers an insurrection, and the government retreats to Versailles. Elections are held in Paris on 26 March, and the Commune is proclaimed on the 28th. For around two months, the Communard administration governs the capital and confronts government troops in a civil war.

Surprisingly, the Communard experiment embodies a real democratic ambition: more direct, more popular and more social.

At an institutional level, the Commune advocates municipal autonomy and oversight of representatives by their voters, with an ideal of recallable mandates.

Political participation is organised beyond elections. Clubs, neighbourhood committees, associations and workers’ organisations discuss decisions and formulate demands. The Commune thus opens up a space for everyday political participation, with a significant presence of working-class communities.

Women take part in clubs, newspapers and organisations such as the Women’s Union — they do not, however, obtain either the right to vote or seats on the Commune Council. Even if this falls short of full civic equality, their participation nevertheless constitutes a real political advance.

Education is seen as a necessary condition for emancipation. The Commune initiates a process of secularising schools and advocates free education accessible to girls and boys alike, as well as vocational education. The democratic aim is to give working-class communities the means to understand, participate and decide. Sadly, the war and the lack of time prevent complete and consistent implementation.

In terms of labour rights, the Commune prohibits night work in bakeries and employers’ fines deducted from wages. It begins considering the takeover of abandoned workshops by workers’ associations.

The Commune does not, however, have time to stabilise: the Bloody Week of 21–28 May 1871 brings it to an end, with fighting and summary executions by the Thiers “Versaillais” government leaving thousands dead. Fires deliberately started on the Communard side destroy monuments, while bombardment by the Versailles forces also causes fires. Hostages, notably the Archbishop of Paris, are executed by Communards.

It would be misleading to portray the Commune as a fully realised democracy: suffrage remains male, even though some women participate in the movement without obtaining electoral equality, and the Commune also remains an experiment conducted amid civil war, creating a Committee of Public Safety that concentrates power and divides its own elected representatives. It is therefore not a perfectly realised direct democracy. Nevertheless, the Paris Commune constitutes a very worthwhile attempt at genuine democracy — and it is born of violence.

May 1968. The movement of May 1968 emerges in a France that is certainly prosperous but marked by profound inequalities. The France of the Trente Glorieuses — the thirty years of post-war economic growth — does not benefit everyone: workers have modest wages, repetitive tasks and punishing production rates, and are subject to strong managerial authority. Working weeks often exceed the statutory forty hours. Social protest therefore begins not with students, but with workers.

Students join in and challenge overcrowded lecture theatres, uncertain career prospects and a highly hierarchical institution in which their participation in decision-making is limited.

This protest is accompanied by a challenge to social conventions, calling for greater personal and sexual freedom in a society that remains deeply rigid.

Finally, the protests target institutions and public media, perceived as closely tied to those in power.

Not all demonstrators share the same objectives or convictions, but police interventions and arrests provoke strong feelings and help broaden the movement. Clashes multiply in the Latin Quarter of Paris, and over the following days, strikes and factory occupations spread.

The social gains born of May 1968 are very concrete, chiefly concerning wages and trade union rights, alongside university reform.

The Grenelle negotiations of May 1968 lead to an increase of around 35% in the SMIG, the predecessor of the SMIC minimum wage. Wages also rise, and workplace trade unions gain recognition. As regards universities, the Faure law of November 1968 reorganises higher education around autonomy and participation. It opens university governance more widely to the different groups within universities, including students, directly translating the university crisis into institutional change.

There are therefore social gains secured without physical violence, but others born amid the pain of physical violence.

Contemporary France is very fond of revolution when it is depicted in paintings or books — it contributes to the national narrative and is wildly romantic and galvanising in retrospect — but to contemplate the Revolution of 1789, the Paris Commune or the Resistance without fully accepting the violence such historical events entail verges, at best, on naïvety or reveals, at worst, abysmal ignorance.

Am I calling for a popular insurrection? Certainly not. Like many of my fellow citizens, I am trying to see a little more clearly through a terribly confused situation. I am trying, as neutrally as possible, to put things in their proper place, to approach them as factually and with as much nuance as possible, in a world where we are battered by categorical, monolithic opinions and analyses — not to mention the fake news proliferating here and there.

Once again: courage to us all.

Editor’s note. There is no pictures today with this article. We’ve seen too many already.

October 24, 2026

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